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EVOLVING JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD

Local Government
Land Use Control*
Terrance Sandalow, Professor of Law, University of Michigan

The year 1967 begins the second
half-century of zoning in the United
States. The first comprehensive
zoning ordinance was adopted by
New York City in 1916. In the fifty years that have elapsed, zoning
has become, notwithstanding a
growing disenchantment with it on
the part of planners, the most
widely employed technique of land
use control in the United States.
At the present time only Houston,
of all the major cities in the
United States, lacks a zoning ordinance. And, though I have not
obtained precise figures, we are
all familiar with the increasingly
large per centage of small municipalities, many with populations
less than 5,000, that have adopted
zoning ordinances.
Curiously, particularly in view
of the fact that zoning was largely
the invention of lawyers, the legal
profession has until recently, paid
little attention to the legal problems of this pervasive control.
Only in the last dozen years or so
*This article is based upon a lecture delivered at the Institute on Minnesota Municipal Law and Procedure.
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have the law schools, for example,
found a place in the curriculum
for systematic study of zoning.
In any event, I think it is fair to
conclude that this traditional disinterest has now ceased. Your
presence here today is, presumably, sufficient evidence of the fact
that I need not belabor the point,
though it might be worth pointing
out that zoning has achieved the
ultimate stamp of professional
acceptance -- West Publishing
Company has recently incorporated it as a heading in its digests.
My assignment today, as I understand it, is to discuss with you
evolving judicial attitudes toward
local government land use control. Although that subject is
broader than zoning, encompassing, for example, both subdivision regulation and the technique
of official mapping, it seems to
me desirable to focus exclusively
on zoning. Important and fascinating questions are raised by these
other techniques, but in the limited
time available not everything can
be covered and since zoning is the
most widely employed technique
The Bench and Bar of Minnesota

of land use control, I think we can
spend our limited time most profitably by dealing only with zoning.
I would like to proceed by discussing first the "traditional"
view of zoning; traditional in the
sense that it was the view held by
the early proponents of zoning, the
view that under lies virtually all of
the enabling legislation in effect
in the United States, and, most
importantly for our purposes, the
view underlying the arguments
used in the early years to sell
zoning to the courts. After providing this framework, I would like
to discuss with you some critical
issues in contemporary zoning
litigation and at least some of the
judicial responses to these issues.
THE "TRADITIONAL"
VIEW OF THE PURPOSE
AND TECHNIQUES OF ZONING

Zoning, as I have indicated,
began in 1916, but a public control of land use began much earlier. The law of nuisance, largely
developed by courts but with an
occasional assist from a legislative body, dates back to the early
days of the common law. From it
we drew the command -- more
frequently stated than enforced -"use your own property in such a
manner as not to injure that of
another." That maxim has had, as
we shall see, some importance in
establishing the validity of zoning.
Around the turn of the century,
legislative enactments controlling
land use became more common,
primarily in the large cities. Use
restrictions were enacted in
Washington in 1889 and upheld in
Boston in 1909. Welch v. Swasey,
214 U.S. 91, (1907). Often, these
restrictions were uniform
throughout the municipality, but
different regulations in different
districts were not unknown. As
early as 1799 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upheld an ordinance prohiting construction of
wooden buildings in certain popuMay 1967

lous areas of Philadelphia Respublica v. Philip Urban Du~,
2 Yeates 493 (1799),
The elements of zoning were,
therefore, neither entirely novel
nor judicially untested when New
York enacted its ordinance. What
was novel about zoning was its
comprehensiveness. Whereas earlier ordinances attempted to deal
with relatively limited problems,
often in only limited areas, zoning
represented an attempt to control
land use in substantial detail
throughout the jurisdiction. It is
hardly surprising, therefore, particularly when it is remembered
that zoning began in the heyday of
substantive due process, that its
constitutionality was much in
doubt. These doubts, as we shall
see, profoundly affected the
draftsmen of zoning legislation-affected them in ways that have a
continuing importance. But that is
a matter to which we will return
later.
In the decade following adoption
of the New York ordinance, zoning
ordinances met with mixed judicial reaction. In some states they
were upheld; in others they were
invalidated, but on grounds which
left open the possibility that valid
ordinances might be adopted; and
in others, including Minnesota,
zoning was held invalid as a deprivation of property without due
process of law. There the matter
stood when, in 1926, the case of
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty: Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) reached the United States Supreme
Court. By a 5-4 vote, the Court,
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Sutherland, upheld the validity of zoning,
a result subsequently followed by
virtually all state courts, and in
the few states in which courts
balked, by constitutional
amendment.
The reas~ning of the Court is
instructive, for in the time-honored manner of the profession it
drew upon an ancient principle to
sustain the validity of this new
13

regulatory technique. The maxim
that one ought not use his land so
as to injure that of another was
invoked by the Court to define the
scope of governmental power to
control land use •. In the Court's
words,
''. • • the law of nuisance •••
may be consulted, not for the
purpose of controlling, but for
the helpful aid of its analogies
in the process of ascertaining
the scope of the power."
The very limited basis upon
which the Court upheld zoning
needs to be stressed. Zoning was
sanctioned not as a device for
substituting governmental allocation of land resources for market
allocation--Mr. Justice Sutherland was not, in other words,
sanctioning soc i a 1 i sm. Zoning
was, in effect, approved as an extension of private rights in property. The government has power to
protect landowners from an incompatible use of neighboring
property. The common law of
nuisance did not define the limits
of governmental power, but it did
provide the ethical justification.
The limited basis upon which
zoning was upheld by Mr. Justice Sutherland cannot be explained
as the attempt of a conservative
judge to limit government power.
In the mid-1920's, shortly before
the decision in Euclid, the Department of Commerce promulgated a Standard State Zoning Enabling Act which had been drafted
by a group of leading zoning lawyers. Since that act provided the
model for virtually all state enabling legislation, including the
recently enacted Minnesota statute, a careful study ofthe Act will
repay the effort.
An examination of the Act reveals that, although there is an
occasional phrase _suggesting a
broader purpose, the draftsmen
contemplated precisely the same
role for zoning as was subsequently articulated by Mr. Justice
Sutherland in Euclid, the pro14

tection of landowners against the
incompatible use of neighboring
land. That objective was to be
achieved by the separation ofwhat
were thought to be incompatible
uses. The illustrations discussed
by the Court in Euclid were, undoubtedly, precisely those which
the draftsmen of the legislation
had in mind. Thus, Justice Sutherland justified the exclusion of industry from residential areas on
the ground that it would tend to
prevent street accidents by a reduction of traffic and that it would
decrease noise and other conditions which produce or intensify
nervous disorders. Similarly, the
ex c 1u s i on of apartment houses
from areas of single family houses
was justified on the ground that
their height and bulk interfered
"with the free circulation of air"
and monopolized "the rays of the
sun which otherwise would fall
upon the smaller homes • • •"
The Standard Act was based
upon the assumption that these
purposes would be achieved by a
division of the jurisdiction into
districts, with pre-stated uniform
regulations applicable to each.
That is, separationofincompatible
uses was to be accomplished by
segregating different categories of
uses. Commerce was to be separated from residential areas and
industry from both ofthese. Often,
each category was further refined: residential zones, for example, were divided into zones in
which only single family dwellings
were permitted, zones in which
single family and duplexes were
permitted, and zones in which any
residential use was permissible.
Of c r u cia 1 importance to the
scheme of regulation was the fact
that the regulation applicable to
each district and the boundaries of
each district were, as is commonly
true of legal prescriptions, formulated in advance of any particular
application for development. The
system thus assumed that it was
possible by careful intellectual efThe Bench and Bar of Minnesota

fort to pre-determine to a large
extent the trend of desired development.
There are two important corollaries of this critical assumption. The first involves the relationship of zoning to planning.
Although it was, of course, contemplated that zoning regulations
would be the product of municipal
planning, it seems fairly clear that
the Standard Act -- and the state
acts which followed it -- did not
express any coherent view about
the relationship between zoning
and planning. True, the Act provided that zoning regulations "shall
be made in accordance with a
comprehensive plan ... " but this
has been interpreted by the courts,
in line with the apparent intention
of the draftsmen, as requiring
merely that regulation be "wellconsidered", or "rational", i.e.,
hardly more than the constitution
would in any event have required.
See, e.g., Kozesnik v. Township
of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131
A.2d 1 (1957).
For most modern planners,
there is a much clearer relationship between zoning and planning -- zoning is merely one of
the tools of planning , and planning, ultimately, involves the making of a plan, i.e., a document or
series of documents which by map
or words or both expresses the
community's conclusions as to desired patterns of physical development. The function of the zoning
ordinance in this view is to channel development in the manner
contemplated by the plan. From a
lawyer's perspective, it will be
seen, such a plan would be extremely useful in ascertaining the
validity of various decisions made
in the adoption and enforcement
of zoning ordinances. But the need
for a plan to serve such a function is least when, as contemplated
by the Standard Act, regulations
are uniform within a district and
are relatively inflexible.
This brings us to the second
May 1967

corollary of the Standard Act's
assumption that regulation should
proceed by pre-stated, uniform
regulation of all land within a
district. As Professor Mandelker
has written, ''What is immediately
striking about the American zoning
pattern is that the exercise of administrative discretion was conceived as a tangential rather than
an integral phase in administration. As the ordinances intended to
solve most land use problems in
advance, the use of the dispensing power was considered to be
exceptional rather than the expected." Mandelker, Delegation of
Power and Function in Zoning
Administration, 1963 Wash. Univ.
L. Q. 60 (1963). The act did,
however, provide three techiques
for achieving a degree of flexibility in the administration of
zoning ordinances.
First, in language similar to
that used in section 462.357 of the
Minnesota statutes, the act provided for a Board of Adjustment
authorized to issue variances
from the terms of the ordinance
"as will not be contrary to the
public interest, where, owing to
special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the
ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the
spirit of the ordinance shall be
observed and substantial justice
done." The provision for variances recognized that general regulations for districts could not take
into account instances of particular hardship based on unique circumstances. The variance was
thus a constitutional "safety valve."
Second, the act authorized local
governments to enable boards of
adjustment ''in appropriate cases
and subject to conditions and safeguards" to make special exceptions to the terms of an ordinance "in harmony with its general purpose and intent and in
accordance with general or specific rules" contained in the or15

dinance. This is the statutory
basis for the technique variously
denominated the "special exception," "special permit," or "conditional use permit." Early texts
do not give the device prominence.
Apparently, it was not thought that
the device would be widely used.
Rather, it was intended to provide
a means for controlling a relatively small number ofuses
''considered by the legislative
body to be essentially desirable
(or essential) to the community,
its citizenery or to substantial
segments thereof, but where the
nature of the use or its concomitants (traffic congestion,
density of persons, noise, effect on values, safety or health)
militate against its location at
every location therein or in any
location without restrictions or
conditions tailored to fit the
special problems which the use
presents." 1 Rathkopf, The Law
of Zoning and Planning 54-1
(1962).
A third method of achieving
flexibility under the Standard Act
was by amendment of the zoning
ordinance. Thus, the governing
body can achieve a considerable
amount of flexibility by multiplying the number of districts, and
by amendment of the map of the
zoning ordinances to reclassify
relatively small parcels.
Since it was not contemplated
that any of these devices for
achieving flexibility would be
widely employed, the Standard Act
provided few if any safeguards
against their abuse. Procedure
before the Board of Adjustment is
regulated only minimally. No provision was made, for example, for
even so minimal a procedural
safeguard as a written opinion or
findings by the Board to justify its
decision. Inattention to these matters has, subsequent discussion
will show, given rise to extremely troublesome questions.
With this background, we can
profitably turn to the critical is16

sues in contemporary zoning litigation and the evolving judicial
attitudes toward these issues.
First, the problem of flexibility.
THE NEED FOR FLEXIBLE CONTROLS

Experience has amply demonstrated the need for deviation from
uniformity of regulation not only in
the situations foreseen by draftsmen of the Standard Act, but in
other situations as well. Pressure
for flexible controls exists at
virtually every point touched by
zoning ordinances, most acutely
in areas of change, the largely
undeveloped areas on the urban
f r i n g e and decaying neighborhoods, but to some extent in relatively stable, developed areas
as well.
(a) The Problem in Undeveloped Areas
-Perhaps because it was Initially devised to regulate land
use in developed urban centers,
traditional zoning has been
somewhat of a misfit in · undeveloped areas. Division of a
municipality into districts, with
varying regulations for each
district, is based upon the assumption that each district has
unique characteristics discoverable by experts which make
it peculiarly suitable for certain purposes. The assumption
perhaps has a certain validity
in 1 a r g e 1y developed areas
where a primary purpose of
regulation is to protect existing
uses against encroachment by
incompatible uses. Occasionally
it may also be true in undeveloped areas, when, for example, access to railroads or
major thoroughfares may make
certain land particularly suitable for industrial or commercial development or scenic vistas may make some land especially valuable for residential
development. More frequently,
however, the land is suitable for
a variety of uses, at least if certain conditions are met. Under
these circumstances, division of
The Bench and Bar of Minnesota

the municipality into the traditional hierarchy of districts may
create a number of problems.
Local governments have the
power to create districts for
certain purposes, but not the
power to require developers to
develop the land for these purposes. In consequence, premature restrictions may create
constitutional objections, see
Arverne Bay Constr. Co. :x_.
Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15N.E.
2nd 587 (1938), and impede the
ability of the municipality to attract industry by artificially
raising the cost of land designated for industrial purposes.
Experience suggests also that
traditional zoning controls are
not well adapted to large-scale
integrated development of residential, commercial, or industrial areas, increasingly the pattern of development in undeveloped areas.
Partly in response to these
problems, planning theory in recent years has shifted from emphasis on a priori classification
and segregation of "incompatible" uses to emphasis upon the
mixture of uses and the conditions under which that might be
successfully accomplished. The
difficulty of foreseeing all of
the relevant circumstances and
the conditions under which various uses might be mixed have
inevitably led to a ''wait and
see" attitude on the part of local
officials; in other words, to a
flexible approach to regulation
not contemplated by the Standard
Act or enabling legislation patterned after it and for which,
c on s e q u en t I y , no adequate
framework was provided.
(b) The Problem in DeveloP.ed
Areas
Inability to impose individualized controls within a district
prevents the i nt r o duct ion of
"lower" uses into "higher"use
districts even though in particular situations that might be
May 1967

accomplished with no harm -and perhaps with benefit -- to
other land within the district.
The problem is perhaps most
acute in connection with the
introduction of commercial uses
into residential areas, but it is
familiar in other situations also.
A landowner desires to open a
grocery store, or any ofadozen
other neighborhood retail facilities in a residential district.
The proposed store would be
small enough that it would be
unlikely to bring much traffic
into the neighborhood or to affect surrounding property adversely in any other way; it
would be a convenience to residents of the neighborhood.
Neither a variance or a rezoning of the parcel is technically
permissible. Rezoning ofthe entire neighborhood as commercial would permit introduction of
uses less compatible with the
residential characters of the
area. A It hough that problem
might be solved by creation of a
commercial zone restricted to
small, retail, convenience facilities, there remains the
question whether it is desirable
to open up the entire neighborhood to commercial development and to forego all community control over the location of
the proposed use and the conditions necessary to fit the use
into a particular setting.
Related problems are raised
in "lower" use districts where
lack of power to impose individualized controls deprives municipalities of the ability to cope
with uses generally permitted
in a district but which, inaparticular situation, may pose
special problems. The traditional view is reflected in Bassett's statement that ''The best
zoning argument for a new
theatre permit is that the block
is already largely occupied by
theatres." Basset, Zoning 53
(1940), Diffusion of traffic gen17

erators may, however, be of
substantial importance to the
community, or in s om e situations, diffusion may not be
necessary, but the existence of a
number of traffic generators
may indicate the necessity for
imposing conditions upon newcomers. The difficulty of foreseeing all of the situations in
which the problem may occur
--e.g., availability of off-street
parking, character of the surrounding areas, etc.--are likely
to require that the problem be
handled administratively if local
governments are to be enabled
to deal with it at all.
JUDICIAL REACTION TO FLEXIBLE
CONTROL TECHNIQUES

Local governments have responded to these problems by using·
both the devices for achieving flexibility provided by the enabling
legislation and by inventing some
devices that were not provided for.
Judicial reaction to these efforts
by local governments reveals no
consistent pattern-- at best we can
identify what may be trends in the
litigated cases.
With respect to variances, an
impressive series of studies in
widely separated parts of the
country establish that anywhere
from fifty to ninety per cent ofthe
variances granted by Boards of
Adjustment (or by councils where
they have assumed the function)
are illegal. In general, courts have
responded with a fairly rigorous
statement of the c i r cum s t an c e
justifying grant of a variance.
The hardship must be substantial,
it must relate to the land not the
landowner, and it must be unique
to a small area of land, not general
within the district. But since very
few cases reach the courts, the law
as defined by courts has not been
particularly important in practice.
Closely related is the problem
posed for the courts by the growing
use of ''special exceptions". At
first courts had difficulty in dis18

tinguishing between variances and
exceptions. More recently, however, courts have distinguished the
two and judicial review has centered mainly on the adaquacy of
the standards governing the grant
of exceptions. Mandelker's review
of cases shows that "nuisance
standards" -- negatively phrased
standards directing that uses not
be allowed as exceptions if they
would be incompatible with neighboring land uses -- have been approved overwhelmingly. 0 r d inances without any standards -simply authorizing an administrative board to issue an exception
-- generally have been held invalid
delegations of legislative authority. But most zoning ordinances
posit general welfare standards
and here judicial reaction is mixed. (Usually the ordinance allows
the board to permit any of the
enumerated special uses if such
action would be in accord with the
purposes and intent of the ordinance and be conducive to the
general welfare,) Many cases sustain such standards without any
critical comment. Some courts
attempt to evaluate such standards
and conclude that they are certain
enough in view of the technological
complexities of zoning administration. A number of cases hold
such standards unconstitutional or
ultra vires. Confusingly, courts in
the same jurisdiction, and even the
same courts, render inconsistent
opinions on similar standards in
different cases. Mandelker, mJ-Rra
at 74-80; See Annot. Zoning, Delegation of Authority, 58 A. L.R. 2d
1083 (1958).

The problems raised by exceptions are like those raised by variances. At base is the fear that
without somewhat concrete standards landowners will be vulnerable
to discrimination. In addition is
the desire to have policy made by
a representative body and to assure neighborhood status quo. And
as with variances, courts have not
been able to take solace in procedThe Bench and Bar of Minnesota

ural regularity because enabling
acts and ordinances have not required administrative agencies to
state in detail the reasons for
granting or denying exceptions.
An excellent student note in 49
Minn. L. Rev. at p. 973 argues,
quite persuasively in my judgment, that two comparatively recent decisions by the Minnesota
Supreme Court which caused considerable consternation and confusion among municipal attorneys
and planners are largely the product of the court's inadequately expressed concern with the possibilities for abuse of the special
permit. I have in mind, of course,
the decisions in Olson v. City...2f
Minneapolis, 213 Minn. 1, 115 N.
W.2d 734 (1962) and Golden v. City
of St. Louis Park 266 Minn. 46,
122 N.W.2d 570 (1963). In each
case the court invalidated a denial
of a special permit in a situation
in which the standards for issuance
for a permit were either nonexistent or inadequate, and in
which no reasons were given for
the decision. On these grounds, the
court's decisions, if not the language of the opinions seems quite
appropriate, It is true, of course,
that in each case, it was the council that was responsible for grant
or denial of a permit and that legislative bodies are not normally
required to state reasons for their
decisions, nor are standards typically required to guide them in
the exercise of the discretion they
possess. Yet, surely the power
exercised by the council in each
of these cases is not a normal exercise of legislative power, but is
more akin to the powers typically
exercised by administrative bodies. Under these circumstances,
does it not seem more appropriate
that the safeguards normally provided against abuse of administrative power should be applicable
also when similar powers are exercised by the governing body? I
cannot prove, of course, that these
considerations actually influenced
May 1967

the decision in the Olson and
Golden cases, but there are straws
in the wind that suggest the growing concern of courts with this
problem. Perhaps the most articulate judicial statement was
that by Mr. Justice Klingbiel of
the Illinois Supreme Court, concurring in the Court's decision in
Ward v. Village of Skokie, 21 Ill.
2d 415, 186 N.E.2d 529 (1962), a
case which involved the validity
of a denial by the council of a
special permit for a motel:
It is not a part of the legislative function to grant permits,
make special exceptions, or decide particular cases. Such activities are not legislative but
administrative, quasi- judicial
or judicial in character. To
place them in the hands of legislative bodies, whose acts as
such are not judicially reviewable, is to open the door completely to arbitrary government.
I need not dwell at length on
the obvious opportunity this affords for special privilege, for
the granting offavors to political
friends or financial benefactors,
for the withholding of permits
from those not in the good
graces of the authorities, and so
on. The rule is familiar enough
that courts may not inquire into
the motives or reasons on which
the legislative body acted. See
Village of Justice v. Jamieson,
7 Ill. App.2d 113, 129 N.E.2d
269.
It is because of this immunity
from review that legislative
bodies must confine themselves
to the prescribing of general
rules. If they may undertake to
confer upon themselves authority to decide what in fact amount
to in d i v i dual or particular
cases, the foundations of our
legal system will fast disappear.
Concededly it is difficult in
zoning matters to formulate a
precise test separating legislative from ad mini s t r at i v e
or quasi-judicial functions. For
19

one thing the legislative function of laying down general rules
or regulating by district becomes less clear cut in its nature as the size of the district
or the number of people affected decreases. It seems to
me, however, that there can be
no reasonable doubt about the
special permit power with which
the village attempts to invest
itself here. Legislation is essentially prohibitory, operating
by laying down general rules. It
does not consist in the permitting of conduct or the granting
of individual relief. Legislative
bodies are not equiped, except
in a very broad and general
way, to ascertain factual questions which depend upon evidence of individual circumstances. Their function is not to
grant permits but to say what
facts and conditions should warrant the granting of permits.
Stone v. Cray, 89 N.H. 384, 200
A. 517 (1938).
What is an application for
special permit but a particular
case? The granting or refusal
of the permit does not lay down
a rule or prescribe any conditions. It is simply a decision on
a concrete set offacts, affecting
the property of particular parties only. It is the nature of the
proceeding, not the identity of
the body assuming to act in the
matter, which should determine
the n e c e s sit y for standards.
Otherwise basic constitutional
protections can readily be circumvented by the simple expedient of placing quasi-judicial
functions in a legislative body,
Very similar considerations are
involved when we turn from special
permits to amendments. Amendments to the text of a zoning
ordinance, norm a 11 y involving
large areas under multiple ownership, raise no special problem.
Here the governing body performs
its traditional, legislative function. But where the amendment
20

involves only a single parcel or at
most a few parcels and is adopted
with reference to a specific proposal for development, the amendment is virtually indistinguishable
from the special permit device.
A recent Mary land decision, Hyson
v. Montgomery County Council,
242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 587 (1966),
in recognizing this fact, suggests
an interesting possibility, that
persons interested in a proposed
rezoning of a parcel may be entitled to procedures of the type
normally required in administrative hearings. In view of the council's actual role in these situations, that appears an eminently
sensible conclusion.
The most interesting of the recent cases concerning amendments are those which involve socalled "floating zones". Under
this technique, the text of the
zoning ordinance provides for a
certain type of district, say, light
industrial. The regulations applicable to the district may be spelled
out in quite some detail. What is
unique is that the district is located
nowhere on the z on i n g map.
Rather, it is contemplated that a
developer desirous of developing
in the manner provided for by the
regulations applicable to the district will apply to the governing
body for an amendment of the
zoning map. The governing body
may then review the application
and if the proposed development
is in accordance with the applicable regulations and if the governing body does not object to the
development on some other
ground, it may amend the map to
permit the development.
In an extreme application, this
technique is, obviously, the very
antithesis of zoning. In Rockhill v.
Chesterfield Township, 23 N.J.
117, 128 A.2d 473 (1956), the only
development permitted of right
under the zoning ordinance was
single-family detached dwellings.
It should not, however, be assumed that this resulted from a
The Bench and Bar of Minnesota

decision by the governing body to
make Chesterfield an entirely residential community. Quite the contrary. The ordinance contemplated both commercial and industrial development, but only upon
grant of a special permit by the
council. The court held this
scheme of regulation unauthorized
by the enabling legislation and
perhaps unconstitutional. As might
be anticipated, the opinion relies
heavily upon the opportunities for
unjustified discrimination inherent in such a scheme.
A more 1 i mite d use of the
"floating zone" technique was examined in Eves ;:.: ~g Board
£! Adjustment 2.f Lower G~nedd
TownshiR, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d
7 (1960).- There the floating zone
was a "limited industrial district". On application by a developer, the governing body amended
the zoning map to permit the ''light
industrial" development in an area
previously zoned residential. On
suit by a neighbor to challenge the
validity of the amendment, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
the scheme invalid as unauthorized by state enabling legislation.
The opinion stresses that such a
system of regulation ''would produce situations in which the personal predilections of the supervisors or the affluence or political
power of the applicant would have
a greater part in determining rezoning applications than the suitability of the land for a particular
use from an overall community
point of view". It relies also upon
the potential of such a system for
frustration of the reasonable expectations of neighboring landowners, since they can never know
whether the "floating zone" will
someday come to rest next door
to them.
Perhaps most significant, however, is the court's conclusion
that the ordinance is not, as required by the enabling legislation, "in accordance with a comprehensive plan":
May
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"The adoption of a procedure
whereby it is decided which
areas of land will eventually be
zoned "F -1" Limited Industrial
Districts on a case by case
basis patently admits that at the
point of enactment of ordinance
28 there was no orderly plan of
particular land use for the community. Final determination under such a scheme would expressly wait solicitation by individual landowners, thus making the planned land use of the
community dependent upon its
development. In other words,
the development itself would
become the plan, which is manifestly the antithesis of zoning
in accordance with a comprehensive plan."
An interesting contrast to the
Eves decision is provided by the
decision of the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Beall y_. Mo!llgQ!illliy
County Council, 240 Md. 77 (1964),
upholding, pursuant to a "floating
zone" provision, the rezoning of a
parcel from "single family detached" to "multiple family, high
rise." The difference in result
between this case and the Eves
case can perhaps be explained as
simply a difference in approach
between two courts, though this
would be difficult because the
Maryland Court traditionally has
taken a rather restrictive view of
the power to adopt map amendments. A more interesting possibility is that the cases were decided differently because of differences in the two ordinances. The
ordinance in the Maryland case,
unlike that in the Pennsylvania,
contained a careful statement of
the community's objective in providing for the floating zone. Although this statement of objective
did not constitute a "plan," it did
provide both criteria to guide the
exercise of the council's discretion and some evidence that the
"floating zone" was responsiveto
legitimate planning needs. Both,
significantly, were emphasized by
21

the court in upholding the "floating
zone", just as the absence of these
factors was emphasized by the
P e n n s y 1 v ani a Court in the
Eves opinion.
The meaning of these decisions
and others that can be cited is, I
think, that courts increasingly are
examing zoning ordinances to ascertain whether they are the product of planning. An ordinance or
action under it which is not a product of planning will not necessarily
fall. If it seems fair in its procedures and its relationship to
health, safety, and general welfare is relatively clear, it is likely
to be upheld even though it is not
preceded by planning. But there is
reason to believe that courts are
beginning to respond more favorably to zoning regulations that are
a consequence of planning. In Appeal of Key Realty Co. 408 Pa:-98,'
i82 A.2d 187 (1962), the Pennsylvania Court, shortly after its
dec i s ion in Eves invalidating
"floating zones", sustained an
amendment rezoning an areafrom
"multiple family" to "single family". The court stressed that this
amendment was the . product of
an overall evaluation by the council of land use within the municipality.
Lest I be misunderstood, let me
make plain that I do not read the
cases as requiring, to sustain the
validity of a zoning ordinance,
that a community have adopted a
master plan. I do think, however,
that there is evidence that communities which have such a plan
will fare better in court than
those which do not, at least ifthey
can relate the provision under
attack to the plan. Failing a fullblown plan, there is evidence that
courts will respond more favorably to the ordinance if it can be
shown that it is the product of
careful assessment by the council of all relevant factual data
and of a policy that has been
articulated in advance of the litigation or of the particular application for development.
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AESTHETICS

Let me turn, very briefly, to
one other matter with respect to
which new judicial attitudes appear to be emerging. For a time,
you may recall, the Minnesota
Supreme Court seemed unable to
write a zoning opinion without including a statement that zoning
solely for aesthetic objectives is
constitutionally impermissible. This is, as you know, an
accurate statement of the traditional view in the United States,
at least if one is to credit the
language used by courts. There
is, of course, reason to believe
that the language never accurately
reflected the law. Regulation of
billboards, patently for aesthetic
purposes, has regularly been sustained by the courts, though frequently they have resorted to such
fictions as that the regulation was
permissible because immoral
practices might occur behind
billboards.
In any event, a series of recent
decisions indicate a growing willingness on the part of courts to
give explicit sanction to zoning
for aesthetic objectives. In1956,
Mr. and Mrs. Stover, residents
of Rye, New York, began hanging
in their front yard a clothesline,
filled with old clothes and rags,
as a form of "peaceful protest"
against high taxes. Each year for
the next six, since taxes hardly
ever go down, a new clothesli.ne
was added. Finally, in 1961, the
city responded by adopting an
ordinance prohibiting the erection
and maintenance of clotheslines
in front or side yards abutting a
street. In Peo~ y. Stover, 12
N.Y. 2nd 462, 191 N.E.2d 272
(1963), the ordinance was upheld
by the New York Court of Appeals "as an attempt to preserve
the residential appearance of the
city." Stover was followed by
the Oregon Sup r em e Court in
OregQ!! Ci!Y y. Hartke 240 Ore.
35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965), which
up he 1 d , solely on a e s t h e t i c
The Bench and Bar of Minnesota

grounds, the exclusion of automobile wrecking yards from an
entire municipality.
Our time is too short to permit
a careful discussion of the problem, but I do want to suggest that
these cases, particularly Stover,
reveal the sterility of the longdebate about whether aesthetic
grounds alone can justify exercise
of the police power. As the New
York Court said in Stover:
Once it be conceded that aesthetics is a valid subject of legislative concern, the conclusion
seems inescapable that reasonable legislation designed to promote that end is a valid and
permissible exercise of the police power. If zoning restrictions which implement a policy
of neighborhood amenity are to
be stricken as invalid, it should
be, one commentator has said,
not because they seek to promote
"aesthetic objectives" but solely because the restrictions constitute "unreasonable devices of
implementing community policy." (Dukeminier, Zoning for
Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 218, 231.) Consequently,
whether such a statute or ordinance should be voided should
depend upon whether the restriction was ''an arbitrary and
irrational method of achieving
an attractive, efficiently functioning, prosperous community
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-- and not upon whether the objectives were primarily aesthetic."
I think there is little doubt that
in the years ahead virtually all
American courts will come to this
position. The danger, it seems to
me, is not that the courts will refuse to recognize aesthetics, but
that is doing so they will fail to
assure t h at zoning ordinances
which are adopted in furtherance of
aesthetic objectives constitute reasonable devices for implementing
community policy. There are, for
example, two r~cent cases upholding ordinances which subject residential development to approval
by architectural review boards.
~ ex rel. Saveland Park Holdi!!g Corp..: y. Wieland 269 Wise.
262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955); Reid
y. Architectual Board Q! Review,
119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E. 2d 74
(1963). Such ordinances pose enormous difficulties. The necessarily
subjective judgments required in
their administration raise serious
questions of impartial enforcement. Equally important, they provide the means for imposing a
stifling orthodoxy with respect to
matters of taste. I am far from
saying that for these reasons the
ordinances must be held constitutionally infirm, but I do think
that the courts have not yet begun
adequately to explore the problem
or to construct adequate safeguards.
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